Mind, Language, and the First-Person Perspective
San Raffaele School of Philosophy 2021
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan
September 28-30, 2021
Invited speakers
Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University)
Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)
Sören Overgaard (University of Copenhagen)
Galen Strawson (University of Texas at Austin)
Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University)
Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)
Sören Overgaard (University of Copenhagen)
Galen Strawson (University of Texas at Austin)
About the School
What is the intrinsic nature of mental phenomena? What makes it the case that mental events, states, and properties are mental? How tight is the relation between language and what counts as mental?
According to Franz Brentano (1874), who famously revived the debate over the mark of the mental in the late 19th century, intentionality is the necessary and sufficient condition for something to be a mental phenomenon. This criterion, which has been by and large embraced by philosophers of mind over the past century, has recently come under criticism and a number of alternative candidates have been proposed. Being conscious and having a phenomenal character have prominently been listed as possible marks of the mental (e.g. Block 1995, Loar 2003, Strawson 2004, Farkas 2008, Kriegel 2011, Montague 2016).
The 2021 San Raffaele School of Philosophy “Mind, Language, and the First-Person Perspective” will explore the nature and tenability of such emerging views, as well as of other potential alternatives to Brentano’s criterion.
The boundaries of the mark of the mental will also be approached from the perspective of classic phenomenology (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Reinach, Scheler, Stein), by addressing the issue of the qualitative varieties of intentionality.
The School will finally zoom in on the connection between language and the phenomena and processes we regard as mental. Focus will be particularly laid on the role that our cognitive perspectives (or perspectival thoughts, Camp 2013, 2017) play in the interpretation of pejorative language (e.g. slurs), moral and aesthetical language (e.g. ‘thick’ terms), and other linguistic expressions that seem to encode or otherwise convey a first-person positioning.
What is the intrinsic nature of mental phenomena? What makes it the case that mental events, states, and properties are mental? How tight is the relation between language and what counts as mental?
According to Franz Brentano (1874), who famously revived the debate over the mark of the mental in the late 19th century, intentionality is the necessary and sufficient condition for something to be a mental phenomenon. This criterion, which has been by and large embraced by philosophers of mind over the past century, has recently come under criticism and a number of alternative candidates have been proposed. Being conscious and having a phenomenal character have prominently been listed as possible marks of the mental (e.g. Block 1995, Loar 2003, Strawson 2004, Farkas 2008, Kriegel 2011, Montague 2016).
The 2021 San Raffaele School of Philosophy “Mind, Language, and the First-Person Perspective” will explore the nature and tenability of such emerging views, as well as of other potential alternatives to Brentano’s criterion.
The boundaries of the mark of the mental will also be approached from the perspective of classic phenomenology (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Reinach, Scheler, Stein), by addressing the issue of the qualitative varieties of intentionality.
The School will finally zoom in on the connection between language and the phenomena and processes we regard as mental. Focus will be particularly laid on the role that our cognitive perspectives (or perspectival thoughts, Camp 2013, 2017) play in the interpretation of pejorative language (e.g. slurs), moral and aesthetical language (e.g. ‘thick’ terms), and other linguistic expressions that seem to encode or otherwise convey a first-person positioning.
Program
(P: in-person, O: online)
September 28, 2021
9:30am-6:50pm (GMT+2)
9:30-10am: Opening
Chair: Elisabetta Sacchi (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
10-11am: Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin), “Rethinking the Attitudes”, P
11-11:40am: Coffee Break
11:40-12:20am: Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire), “Intentionality, Qualia, and the Stream of Unconsciousness”, P
12:25am-1:05pm: Brian Ball (New College of the Humanities, London), “Intentionality, Point of View, and the Role of the Interpreter”, O
1:05-3pm: Lunch
Chair: Claudia Bianchi (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
3-4pm: Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University), “From Point of View to Perspective”, O
4-4:40pm: Coffee Break
4:40-5:20pm: Simone Nota (Trinity College Dublin), “Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Thought Experiment in Ethics”, P
5:25-6:05pm: Nadja-Mira Yolcu (University of Mannheim), “Vindicating Avowal Expressivism: A Note on Rosenthal’s Performance-Conditional Equivalence Thesis”, O
6:10-6:50pm: Maik Niemeck (Marburg University), “Two Problems with Shoemaker’s Regress and How to Deal with Them”, O
September 29, 2021
10:00am-6:50pm (GMT+2)
Chair: Bianca Cepollaro (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
10-11am: Galen Strawson (University of Texas at Austin), “Internal and External Content: a New Alignment”, P
11-11:40pm: Coffee Break
11:40-12:20am: Niccolò Aimone Pisano (University of St. Andrews), “Are Higher-Level Marks of the Cognitive Feasible?”, O
12:25-1:05pm: Jakub Mihalik (Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy/University of Hertfordshire), “Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental”, O
1:05-3pm: Lunch
Chair: Roberta De Monticelli (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
3-4pm: Søren Overgaard (University of Copenhagen), “Is Perception Intentional?”, P
4-4:40pm: Coffee Break
4:40-5:20pm: Federico Zilio (University of Padua), “A Ghost in the Shell? A Sartrean Insight into the Notion of Consciousness as Embodied-being-in-the-world”, P
5:25-6:05pm: Daniel Kim (University of York), “Naïve Realism and Minimal Self”, O
6:10am-6:50pm: Max Minden Ribeiro (Lund University), “Is Presence Perceptual?”, P
September 30, 2021
9:30am-1:10pm (GMT+2)
Chair: Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin)
9:30-10:30am: Katalin Farkas (Central European University), “Privileged Accessibility as the Mark of the Mental”, O
10.30-11:am: Coffee Break
11-11:40am: Alex Grzankowski (Birkbeck, University of London) & Tim Crane (Central European University), “The Significance of the Many Property Problem”, O
11:45-12:25am: Giulia Martina (University of Turin), “Phenomenally-Grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists”, O
12:30-1:10pm: Andrea Tortoreto (University of Turin), “Does the Idea that Intentionality is the MOM Necessarily Entail Dualism?”, P
(P: in-person, O: online)
September 28, 2021
9:30am-6:50pm (GMT+2)
9:30-10am: Opening
Chair: Elisabetta Sacchi (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
10-11am: Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin), “Rethinking the Attitudes”, P
11-11:40am: Coffee Break
11:40-12:20am: Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire), “Intentionality, Qualia, and the Stream of Unconsciousness”, P
12:25am-1:05pm: Brian Ball (New College of the Humanities, London), “Intentionality, Point of View, and the Role of the Interpreter”, O
1:05-3pm: Lunch
Chair: Claudia Bianchi (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
3-4pm: Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University), “From Point of View to Perspective”, O
4-4:40pm: Coffee Break
4:40-5:20pm: Simone Nota (Trinity College Dublin), “Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Thought Experiment in Ethics”, P
5:25-6:05pm: Nadja-Mira Yolcu (University of Mannheim), “Vindicating Avowal Expressivism: A Note on Rosenthal’s Performance-Conditional Equivalence Thesis”, O
6:10-6:50pm: Maik Niemeck (Marburg University), “Two Problems with Shoemaker’s Regress and How to Deal with Them”, O
September 29, 2021
10:00am-6:50pm (GMT+2)
Chair: Bianca Cepollaro (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
10-11am: Galen Strawson (University of Texas at Austin), “Internal and External Content: a New Alignment”, P
11-11:40pm: Coffee Break
11:40-12:20am: Niccolò Aimone Pisano (University of St. Andrews), “Are Higher-Level Marks of the Cognitive Feasible?”, O
12:25-1:05pm: Jakub Mihalik (Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy/University of Hertfordshire), “Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental”, O
1:05-3pm: Lunch
Chair: Roberta De Monticelli (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University)
3-4pm: Søren Overgaard (University of Copenhagen), “Is Perception Intentional?”, P
4-4:40pm: Coffee Break
4:40-5:20pm: Federico Zilio (University of Padua), “A Ghost in the Shell? A Sartrean Insight into the Notion of Consciousness as Embodied-being-in-the-world”, P
5:25-6:05pm: Daniel Kim (University of York), “Naïve Realism and Minimal Self”, O
6:10am-6:50pm: Max Minden Ribeiro (Lund University), “Is Presence Perceptual?”, P
September 30, 2021
9:30am-1:10pm (GMT+2)
Chair: Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin)
9:30-10:30am: Katalin Farkas (Central European University), “Privileged Accessibility as the Mark of the Mental”, O
10.30-11:am: Coffee Break
11-11:40am: Alex Grzankowski (Birkbeck, University of London) & Tim Crane (Central European University), “The Significance of the Many Property Problem”, O
11:45-12:25am: Giulia Martina (University of Turin), “Phenomenally-Grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists”, O
12:30-1:10pm: Andrea Tortoreto (University of Turin), “Does the Idea that Intentionality is the MOM Necessarily Entail Dualism?”, P
Scientific direction
Marta Benenti, Claudia Bianchi, Laura Caponetto, Bianca Cepollaro, Francesca De Vecchi,
Francesca Forlè, Elisabetta Sacchi.
Organizing committee
Federico Cella, Nicolò D’Agruma, Marco Di Feo, Nicole Miglio, Davide Zottoli.