Marking The Mark of the Mental
International Final Conference PRIN Project 2017P9E9NF
May 29 – June 1 2023, Turin
Palazzo Badini Confalonieri, via Verdi 10, II floor
https://unito.webex.com/unito/j.php?MTID=mef7aa26cc202c039124c4aa03b6810c1
Programme
May 29, afternoon
14.30-16.00
Alfredo Tomasetta (IUSS Pavia) A Theory of Phenomenal For-me-ness
16.00-17.30
Elisabetta Sacchi and Alberto Barbieri (S. Raffaele Milan), In Defence of a sui generis Disjunctivist Account of the Mark of the Mental
17.30-18.00
Coffee break
18.00-19.30
Andrea Pace Giannotta (Bergamo), Phenomenal Intentionality and Process Ontology
May 30, morning
9.00-10.30
Laura Gow (Liverpool) Apparent Relationality as the Mark of the Mental (online)
10.30-11.00
Coffee break
11.00-12.30
Kevin Mulligan (Geneva and Lugano), On the Difference between the Mental and the Psychological
May 30, afternoon
14.30-16.00
Tuomas Pernu (East Finland), No Marks of the Mental without Marks of the Physical
16.00-17.30
Gianfranco Soldati (Fribourg), Intentionality: a Natural Mark of the Mental?
17.30-18.00
Coffee break
18.00-19.30
Tim Crane (CEU), Unconscious Intentionality (online)
May 31, morning
9.00-10.30
Guillaume Frechette (Lisbon and Zurich), Intentionality As the Salient Mark of the Mental.
10.30-11.00
Coffee break
11.00-12.30
Mark Textor (King’s College London), Marks of the Mental: Brentano and Beyond
May 31, afternoon
14.30-16.00
Michelle Montague (Austin), Brentano on Relations
16.00-17.30
Katalin Farkas (CEU), Are Character Traits Mental?
17.30-18.00
Coffee break
18.00-19.30
Arnaud Dewalque (Liège), Three Cambridge Arguments for Experientialism
June 1, morning
9.00-10.30
Sam Coleman (Hertfordshire), Consciousness is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Mentality
10.30-11.00
Coffee break
11.00-12.30
Alberto Voltolini (Turin), The Experiential Copula as the Mark of the Mental
The Structure of Intentionality
January 27, 2023
Aula di Antica, Palazzo Nuovo, via S. Ottavio 20 2nd floor, Turin
or join online:
https://unito.webex.com/unito/j.php?MTID=mef7aa26cc202c039124c4aa03b6810c1
Program
Morning
9-10.15 am
Hamid Taieb (Humboldt University Berlin)
Relational Intentionality in the History of Philosophy: An Overview
10.15-11.30 am
Andrew Thomas (University of Durham)
A New Look at Semantic Instrumentalism
11.30-11.45 am Coffee Break
11.45am-1pm
Mohammad Saleh Zarepour (University of Manchester)
Intentionality Primitivism Reconsidered
Afternoon
3pm-4.15pm
Stefania Centrone (FernUni Hagen)
Conceptions of Intentionality
4.15-5.30pm
Andrea Marchesi (University of Rome I)
The Liar, Intentionality, and Parthood
5.30-5.45 pm Coffee Break
5.45-7pm
Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin)
Full-blown Relationality
24 June 2022
International Workshop
The Borders of Cognition
To join in person: Room 1, Piazzale S. Agostino, 2, Bergamo BG
To join online: shorturl.at/tTV89
Speakers
Fiorella BATTAGLIA (Università del Salento, Lecce & Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich)
Fabrizio CALZAVARINI & Alfredo PATERNOSTER (Università degli Studi di Bergamo)
Giulia MARTINA (Università degli Studi di Torino)
William RAMSEY (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)
Elisabetta SACCHI (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano)
Tobias SCHLICHT (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
For information please write to: [email protected] or [email protected]
Programme
9.20 - 9.30 Introduction
9.30 - 10.30 William RAMSEY, Why The Hard Problem of Content is Neither
10.30 - 11.30 Giulia MARTINA, Olfactory categories between language and perception
11.30 - 11.45 Break
11.45 - 12.45 Elisabetta SACCHI, Is psychologism unavoidable in a phenomenologically adequate account of mental content?
12.45 - 14.30 Lunch
14.30 - 15.30 Fabrizio CALZAVARINI & Alfredo PATERNOSTER, On the Nature of Computation
15.30 - 15.45 Break
15.45 - 16.45 Fiorella BATTAGLIA, Predictive algorithms and epistemic injustice
16.45 - 17.45 Tobias SCHLICHT, If there are boundaries of cognition, what is cognition?
**Past Events**
Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS Pavia - Linguistics & Philosophy IUSS Center
IUSS Philosophy Seminars - The Mark of the Mental (MOM) Project
Derk Pereboom on Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Absolutely Intrinsic Properties
The Susan Linn Sage Professor in Philosophy and Ethics Derk Pereboom, author of important philosophical works such as Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021) will be held three lectures at IUSS of Pavia on 21 and 28 October, and on 4 November. The three lectures will be held on Zoom. Everyone is invited.
October 21st, 28th and November 4th 2021, 16.00 – 18.00
October 21, 2021 - 16:00-18:00
Lecture 1: “Anti-physicalist arguments from the nature of consciousness and the Russellian monist response.”
This lecture sets out the knowledge and conceivability arguments against physicalism about phenomenal consciousness. Their functionalist or structuralist assumptions about physicalism are highlighted, assumptions which introduce the possibility of a non-functionalist, non-structuralist response to these arguments, i.e., Russellian monism. The core claim of Russellian monism is that there are non-functionalist, non-structural properties that account for phenomenal consciousness.
October 28, 2021 - 16.00-18.00
Lecture 2: “Russellian monism and absolutely intrinsic properties.”
This lecture proposes that Russellian monism’s non-structural properties are best explicated as absolutely intrinsic properties. In the past, structuralism about physics has been characterized by the claim that physics invokes only relational and no intrinsic properties. But this is clearly mistaken, since basic physical properties structuralists accept, such as shape and size, are intrinsic to their bearers. I contend instead that structuralism is the thesis that physics features no absolutely intrinsic properties, that is, properties not grounded in relational properties. A property may be intrinsic and not absolutely intrinsic. Russellian monism, then, claims that absolutely intrinsic properties are required to account for phenomenal consciousness.
November 4, 2021 - 16.30-18.30
Lecture 3: “The prospects of physicalist Russellian monism and the need for introspective inaccuracy.”
Russellian (monist) physicalism proposes to account for consciousness by physical absolutely intrinsic properties. This view contrasts with Russellian (monist) panpsychism, on which the absolutely intrinsic properties that account for phenomenal consciousness are non-physical. But what are the prospects for a Russellian physicalism that retains the claim that phenomenal consciousness is precisely as it is introspectively represented? I discuss the advantages for a Russellian physicalism that allows for some introspective inaccuracy.
IUSS ONLINE WORKSHOP
"Analytic Phenomenology, Intentionality and Consciousness"
IUSS online Workshop - October 13-15, 2021
Analytic philosophers of mind have traditionally conceived intentionality as a naturalistically acceptable relation holding between a subject's internal states and the targets represented by those states. Yet, recently, a growing number of philosophers has diverted from this tradition, analyzing intentionality in terms of a subject’s phenomenal experience. This diversion is now gaining momentum, and the number of philosophers breaking free from the naturalistic tradition is rapidly rising; so much so that a "phenomenological turn" is now taking place in the analytic philosophy of mind. Analytic phenomenology aims to explain intentionality in terms of phenomenal properties and tries to expand the phenomenal domain to non-sensory states, defending the claim that cognitive states (such as beliefs and desires) have a phenomenology in their own right.
In this workshop, we are going to explore this new wave of analytic phenomenology. In addition to contributed papers, the program includes three keynote talks, all delivered by leading figures in the field:
- Prof. Katalin Farkas (Central European University): Phenomenal intentionality and phenomenal functionalism
- Prof. Angela Mendelovici (University of Western Ontario), Deep internalism
- Prof. Daniel Stoljar (Australian National University), Acquaintance-based VS rationality-based accounts of introspection
More info: http://www.iusspavia.it/-/analytic-phenomenology-intentionality-and-consciousness
Queries at: iussworkshop@iusspavia. it
https://iusspavia.zoom.us/j/99529506550
Mind, Language, and the First-Person Perspective
San Raffaele School of Philosophy 2021
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan
September 28-30, 2021
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan
September 28-30, 2021
Keynote speakers
Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University)
Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)
Sören Overgaard (University of Copenhagen)
Galen Strawson (University of Texas at Austin)
Elisabeth Camp (Rutgers University)
Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)
Sören Overgaard (University of Copenhagen)
Galen Strawson (University of Texas at Austin)
***
Stephen Yablo (MIT, Cambridge MA)
Webinar Lectures on Aboutness and Subject Matter
(video)
November 20, 2020, 5:00-7.00 pm (CET), Turin
"Aboutness: the Basics"
Aboutness is supposed to be the relation sentences bear to their subject matters. But what is S's subject matter? It is made up of S's ways of being true or false. Why believe in ways, when our toolkit already contains possible worlds? An "inference to the best explanation" is sketched. Reviewing a number of would-be analyses in terms of worlds, we find that (i) though tempting, they fail, and (ii) every one can be fixed, or anyway improved, by putting ways in where the worlds were.
November 27, 2020, 5:00-7.00 pm (CET), Turin
"Ways: the Basics"
Unfortunately none of this tells us what a "way for S to be true" really is. They can't be minimal sufficient conditions of truth, for minimal conditions are unavailable in many cases ("There are infinitely many stars" is Kratzer's example). Following Lewis on "world where S is true," we dodge the problem by splitting it inj two: (i) determining which set-of-ways proposition S expresses, and (ii) counting s a way for S to be true if s belongs to the set. (ii) is trivial, and (i) is a job for someone else (the metasemanticist). In effect then we treat the notion as primitive. Still something needs to be said about which primitive is intended. An exceedingly subtle four-part checklist is suggested.
December 4, 2020, 5:00-7.00 (CET) pm, Turin
"Insolubilia"
Ways and subject matter are unleashed on a bunch of puzzles and paradoxes: the Sorites, the Liar, Hempel's paradox of the ravens, Kripke's dogmatism paradox, Makinson's paradox of the preface, and the puzzle of logical omniscience.
"Aboutness: the Basics"
Aboutness is supposed to be the relation sentences bear to their subject matters. But what is S's subject matter? It is made up of S's ways of being true or false. Why believe in ways, when our toolkit already contains possible worlds? An "inference to the best explanation" is sketched. Reviewing a number of would-be analyses in terms of worlds, we find that (i) though tempting, they fail, and (ii) every one can be fixed, or anyway improved, by putting ways in where the worlds were.
November 27, 2020, 5:00-7.00 pm (CET), Turin
"Ways: the Basics"
Unfortunately none of this tells us what a "way for S to be true" really is. They can't be minimal sufficient conditions of truth, for minimal conditions are unavailable in many cases ("There are infinitely many stars" is Kratzer's example). Following Lewis on "world where S is true," we dodge the problem by splitting it inj two: (i) determining which set-of-ways proposition S expresses, and (ii) counting s a way for S to be true if s belongs to the set. (ii) is trivial, and (i) is a job for someone else (the metasemanticist). In effect then we treat the notion as primitive. Still something needs to be said about which primitive is intended. An exceedingly subtle four-part checklist is suggested.
December 4, 2020, 5:00-7.00 (CET) pm, Turin
"Insolubilia"
Ways and subject matter are unleashed on a bunch of puzzles and paradoxes: the Sorites, the Liar, Hempel's paradox of the ravens, Kripke's dogmatism paradox, Makinson's paradox of the preface, and the puzzle of logical omniscience.
***
Workshop on
Intentionality and Consciousness
December 17-18 2020, Turin
5.00-8.00 pm (CET)
Tim Crane (CEU Budapest)
(video)
How Intentionality and Consciousness are not Connected
Abstract: In this talk I describe one popular approach to the understanding of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. At the heart of the analytic account of intentionality is what I call the propositional attitude project. The propositional attitude project, despite being widely accepted, is inadequate in its own terms — because of non-propositional intentionality — and also inadequate as the basis for linking consciousness and intentionality. In the background to the resistance to the intentionalst explanation of consciousness is a conception of consciousness which derives from behaviourism. If we are to understand the connection between intentionality and consciousnesss we must give up both the propositional attitude project and the behaviourist conception of consciousness.
(video)
How Intentionality and Consciousness are not Connected
Abstract: In this talk I describe one popular approach to the understanding of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. At the heart of the analytic account of intentionality is what I call the propositional attitude project. The propositional attitude project, despite being widely accepted, is inadequate in its own terms — because of non-propositional intentionality — and also inadequate as the basis for linking consciousness and intentionality. In the background to the resistance to the intentionalst explanation of consciousness is a conception of consciousness which derives from behaviourism. If we are to understand the connection between intentionality and consciousnesss we must give up both the propositional attitude project and the behaviourist conception of consciousness.
Uriah Kriegel (Rice University, Houston)
(video)
The Structure of Phenomenal Justification
Abstract: Can a conscious experience justify you in believing something purely in virtue of what it is like for you to have that experience? Some philosophers certainly think so, defending what I will call phenomenal dogmatism:
(PD) For some experience E and belief B, (i) E provides immediate prima facie epistemic justification for B and (ii) E does so in virtue of (some of) E’s phenomenal properties.
Something like PD is defended by Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), and following them many others. But PD is also the target of various objections. Some come from Bayesian probability theory, some from the psychology of cognitive penetration, some from broadly Sellarsian reflections on what it takes to justify, and some from other sources. Here I want to consider an objection that may be put as follows: What is so special about perceptual phenomenology that only it can immediately justify beliefs, while other kinds of phenomenology – including quite similar ones – remain ‘epistemically inert’? This objection has been aired a number of times in the recent literature (e.g., Ghijsen 2014, Siegel and Silins 2015, Teng 2018). The reason I want to consider this objection in particular is not that I think it is specially formidable, but because of where the response to the objection will lead us: a deeper understanding of the general phenomenon of phenomenal justification– the very idea of justification in virtue of phenomenology.
Pietro Perconti (University of Messina)
(video)
Mindreading Priority Account:
From an Intentionalist Point of View
Abstract: According to the common sense view, self-consciousness is the climax of human cognition. This provides the ordinary feeling of being special thanks to the faculty of self-consciousness. But we may doubt how much nature cares about our satisfying feeling of being self-conscious. What if self-consciousness has any top role in human cognition (whatever it means)? In particular, is self-consciousness really prior to mindreading?, or the opposite? Name the first thesis "Self-Consciousness Priority Account" (SCPA) and the other "Mind Reading Priority Account" (MRPA). While MRPA is also the view that mindreading evolved prior to self-consciousness, SCPA is the claim that self-consciousness evolved prior to mindreading. In my talk I will argue for the moderate Mindreading Priority Account: Non-conceptual mindreading is prior to self-consciousness, but conceptual mindreading depends on conceptual self-consciousness.
(video)
Mindreading Priority Account:
From an Intentionalist Point of View
Abstract: According to the common sense view, self-consciousness is the climax of human cognition. This provides the ordinary feeling of being special thanks to the faculty of self-consciousness. But we may doubt how much nature cares about our satisfying feeling of being self-conscious. What if self-consciousness has any top role in human cognition (whatever it means)? In particular, is self-consciousness really prior to mindreading?, or the opposite? Name the first thesis "Self-Consciousness Priority Account" (SCPA) and the other "Mind Reading Priority Account" (MRPA). While MRPA is also the view that mindreading evolved prior to self-consciousness, SCPA is the claim that self-consciousness evolved prior to mindreading. In my talk I will argue for the moderate Mindreading Priority Account: Non-conceptual mindreading is prior to self-consciousness, but conceptual mindreading depends on conceptual self-consciousness.
Martine Nida-Ruemelin (University of Fribourg)
(video)
Does Consciousness require pre-reflective self-awareness?
Abstract: two senses of pre-reflective self-awareness are sometimes conflated in contemporary literature (a) awareness of one’s own experience while undergoing the experience and (b) awareness of oneself in undergoing an experience. I will propose an account of (a), primitive awareness, and argue that having an experience and being primitively aware of having it coincide. I will suggest that (b), pre-reflective self-awareness (in the restricted sense in which it is an awareness the subject has of itself) is most likely present in any conscious subject undergoing experiences which exhibit what I will call basic intentionality. For an experience to exhibit basic intentionality is for it to have a subject-object-structure.
(video)
Does Consciousness require pre-reflective self-awareness?
Abstract: two senses of pre-reflective self-awareness are sometimes conflated in contemporary literature (a) awareness of one’s own experience while undergoing the experience and (b) awareness of oneself in undergoing an experience. I will propose an account of (a), primitive awareness, and argue that having an experience and being primitively aware of having it coincide. I will suggest that (b), pre-reflective self-awareness (in the restricted sense in which it is an awareness the subject has of itself) is most likely present in any conscious subject undergoing experiences which exhibit what I will call basic intentionality. For an experience to exhibit basic intentionality is for it to have a subject-object-structure.