The Project
In philosophy of mind, the question of the mark of the mental, i.e., the issue of what renders something (an event, a state, or a property) mental, is not only fundamental, but also timely. For knowing how and whether a system is endowed with mentality, i.e., the most general property that mental items share, also helps one answer to the question of how far up or down in the chain of being there are mental systems, biological and mechanical systems included, to which we owe or feel respect in virtue of their being mental. Hence, in its applications, MOM will try to find a practical answer as to what sort of artificial devices can be planned that can be legitimately taken to be mental.
In the phenomenological tradition starting from Brentano (1995) and Husserl (1970), two different salient properties of the mental have been theoretically taken to be that mark; intentionality, the property of being about something or of having a content that determines for its bearer certain satisfaction conditions, and consciousness, at least phenomenal consciousness, i.e., the fact that a state entertains a certain what-it-is-like: its phenomenal character. In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, both theories have been revived. People have moved either in an intentionalist direction holding that all mental states, even those that are paradigmatically phenomenal, are ultimately intentional, since their phenomenal character at least supervenes on their intentionality. Or they have moved in the opposite, conscientialist, direction, holding that phenomenal consciousness takes pride of price, either reducing intentionality itself to a conscious property – phenomenal intentionality – or taking all mental states as qualified by phenomenology, either qualitative – affecting sensations, emotions and moods – or cognitive – affecting beliefs, expectations and desires. Each move has its own pros and cons; so far, no shared consensus has been reached. MOM aims not only at investigating further the two aforementioned theories, but also to explore whether they exhaust the live options. MOM’s aim is indeed threefold: a) to question whether there is another chance for intentionality to be the mark of the mental; b) to question whether there is another chance for phenomenal consciousness to be that mark; c) to discuss two aspects of the mark of the mental issue prominent in cognitive science, related to the cognitive unconscious and extended mind. |
On the one hand, MOM seeks to further explore to what extent intentionality has priority over phenomenal consciousness or the converse. By starting from an established debate and reconstructing the extant moves, MOM aims to see whether there are more cogent arguments than those hitherto put forward that may orient one in either the intentionalist or the conscientialist direction. On the other hand, MOM aims to see whether the mark of the mental may have to do with a cognitive role of mental states (whether conscious or not), that is sufficiently fine-grained so as to distinguish it from any generically causal role that physical states may have, and lead to a specifically psychological explanation of a system’s behaviour. This has both theoretical and empirical repercussions. On the theoretical side, it helps one provide an answer to the contemporary question of whether the mind is extended, i.e., whether it is realized in mechanisms located outside the brain. For it assesses to what extent such noncentral mechanisms are mental. On the empirical side, it helps one not only build biorobotical devices qua mental systems, but also select which sorts of biological species may legitimately qualify as mental, so as to be ultimately subjects of moral properties or of empathic reactions on the part of humans.
As to aims a)-c), each of MOM’s four units will both thematize one of them in particular and coordinate with the other units in order to find helpful theoretical connections. Specifically, the Turin unit will mainly investigate aim a), in connection with the general idea, taken both historically and theoretically, that intentionality is the mark of the mental; the S. Raffaele unit will also explore aim a) but in relation with the issue of the role that phenomenal intentionality, in its meaning-determining function, plays as to the issue of which takes the pride of place as between intentionality and consciousness; the IUSS unit will investigate both aim b), in connection with the general idea that consciousness is the mark of the mental, and aim c), in particular as to the question of how the issue of the mark of the mental has bearings on the ‘extended mind’ debate; the Bergamo unit will mainly investigate aim c), with an eye as to the issue of how far unconscious processes can be taken to be mental, along with providing a general survey as to the underlying metaphysics of the mind involved in the three options as to the mark of the mental – intentional, conscious, cognitive.
As to aims a)-c), each of MOM’s four units will both thematize one of them in particular and coordinate with the other units in order to find helpful theoretical connections. Specifically, the Turin unit will mainly investigate aim a), in connection with the general idea, taken both historically and theoretically, that intentionality is the mark of the mental; the S. Raffaele unit will also explore aim a) but in relation with the issue of the role that phenomenal intentionality, in its meaning-determining function, plays as to the issue of which takes the pride of place as between intentionality and consciousness; the IUSS unit will investigate both aim b), in connection with the general idea that consciousness is the mark of the mental, and aim c), in particular as to the question of how the issue of the mark of the mental has bearings on the ‘extended mind’ debate; the Bergamo unit will mainly investigate aim c), with an eye as to the issue of how far unconscious processes can be taken to be mental, along with providing a general survey as to the underlying metaphysics of the mind involved in the three options as to the mark of the mental – intentional, conscious, cognitive.