One of the ways of cashing out the idea that intentionality is phenomenal is to claim that it is presentational in character. Brentano's idea that Vorstellungen (presentations viz re-presentations) are the most basic mental viz. intentional states is sometimes adduced as a possible support for that claim. Yet not only, unlike belief-like states, perceptual-like experiences are the genuine owners of presentational character, but for them, their presentational aspect is distinct from their representational aspect. Genuine perceptual experiences, for examples, are such that not only they may present different worldly properties even if they share their representational content (in inversion cases) but also that they may present the same worldly property even if they differ in their representational content (as in the case of veridical perceptual experiences and illusory perceptual experiences caused by the same object).
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